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Introduction
Information used in real applications is often uncertain, which reflects a kind of reliability of sources and sensors. In addition, knowledge bases are not static. There are always new information that should be taken into account. In probabilistic frameworks, these two aspects (i.e., uncertain and dynamic) are handled in homogeneous way by representing uncertainty associated with information in the form of probability distributions, and using different forms of conditioning for updating.
In Artificial Intelligent (AI) community, since 1985, the process of changing beliefs with new information is known as belief revision. Belief revision [1, 28, 34] performs belief change on an agent's beliefs when new evidence is received. It has been observed that a pure logic-based revision framework, e.g., AGM postulates based framework, may permit some counterintuitive results in iterated revision 1 . As a result, revision on epistemic states should be introduced accordingly [14, 4, 51, 5, 33, 42] , etc.
However, in most of these research efforts, new evidence is still represented as a propositional formula, not an epistemic state (even if initial epistemic state may be a propositional formula or a totally pre-ordered relation on a set of possible worlds). Therefore, these methods do not fully implement a revision that reflects the effect of epistemic states, e.g., new information could be uncertain [14, 15] . Although an effort has been made to address this problem in a couple of papers (e.g., [4] ), in which new evidence is represented as a full epistemic state. The revision methods proposed still cannot manage the strengths over partitions on a set of interpretations, which, in probability or possibility settings, is already accomplished by Jeffrey's rule [3] . That is, we need to develop a revision framework which can deal with new information with strengths that could be modeled by partial epistemic states similar to the probability counterparts of Jeffrey's rule. Here we should note that new information not only comes from observations of the agent on the environment but can also be conveyed by other agents where epistemic makes sense. So here we use partial epistemic states as inputs which we aim to cover both situations, even if there might be some abuse of concept.
Jeffrey's rule is widely applied when an agent's current belief and new evidence are both modeled in probability measures. More precisely, in Jeffrey's rule, the prior state is a probability distribution representing an agent's current beliefs or generic knowledge whilst new evidence is a partial probability measure solely on a partitioned subsets of the world. Similar strategies were also proposed for ordinal conditional functions (OCFs) [58, 59] , for possibility measures [19, 3] , etc. However, despite of the need to handle new, input information with strengths that may be present in different forms, to the best of our knowledge, there does not exist a common revision strategy (and its corresponding postulates) to address this issue. In another words, can we develop a general revision framework that subsumes these individual revision strategies (in different frameworks) with a set of common postulates? A significant advantage of this, if achievable, is to facilitate further understanding of the nature of revision, regardless of which formalism may be deployed to represent an agent's beliefs and new uncertain evidence.
To answer this question, we first propose a framework to represent an agent's epistemic beliefs, which generalizes various definitions of epistemic states in the literature (e.g., a weighted formula [33, 48] , a total pre-order [4] , an OCF-based epistemic state [49, 58, 59 ], a probability measure [30] , a partial pre-order [45, 41] , a mass function [46, 47] , etc). This framework takes inspirations from Jeffrey's rule of conditioning under uncertain inputs. We then investigate how a set of rational postulates should be derived to regulate revision operators defined from this framework and provide representation theorems for these postulates. We prove that these postulates are satisfied by OCF conditionalization, possibility conditionalization, and most significantly Jeffrey'rule of conditioning.
Our main objective of defining a general iterated revision framework is to implement the revision of an agent's current beliefs (represented as a full epistemic state) with new, uncertain evidence (represented as a partial epistemic state). In standard AGM framework, there are no explicit representations of strengths associated with initial beliefs and inputs (even if any revision operator that satisfies AGM postulates is implicitly based on some total pre-order on interpretations). Our framework, however, supports the explicit representation of strengths which will help in determining the result of revision.
Furthermore, we investigate the relationships between this general framework with logic-based belief/epistemic revision, especially with Darwiche and Pearl's (DP's) belief revision framework [14] . We prove that when reducing to the belief revision situation, our postulates can induce DP's postulates C1 and C2.
To summarize, the main contributions of the paper are:
• Our definition of epistemic states subsumes many existing definitions of epistemic states.
• We provide a generalized revision strategy and corresponding postulates.
• We prove two presentations theorems which show clear and succinct kinematic semantics in revision.
• We prove that our framework can recover many existing numerical revision operators, e.g., Jeffrey's rule, OCF conditionalization, possibilistic revision, etc.
• When an input is a formula, our postulates can induce all the AGM-KM postulates and Darwiche and Pearl's C1, C2 postulates.
In other words, our framework provides an important one step forward of extending the various existing revision strategies and revision operators. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We provide the preliminaries and Jeffrey's rule in Section 2 and 3 respectively. In Section 4, formal definitions of epistemic space and epistemic state are introduced. In Section 5, we propose a set of postulates for epistemic revision and their corresponding representation theorems. In Section 6 and Section 7, we discuss how our framework subsumes existing revision strategies. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 8.
Preliminaries
We consider a propositional language L defined on a finite set A of propositional atoms, which are denoted by p, q, r etc. A proposition φ is constructed by propositional atoms with logic connectives ¬, ∧, ∨, → in the standard way. An interpretation ω (or possible world) is a function that maps A onto the set {0, 1}. The set of all possible interpretations on A is denoted as W . Function ω can be extended to any proposition in L in the usual way. An interpretation ω is a model of (or satisfies) φ iff ω(φ) = 1, denoted as ω |= φ. We use M od(φ) to denote the set of models for φ. We write (ψ) . Furthermore, we also take the view that a proposition φ can be equivalently represented by a subset of the set of possible worlds W . That is, for any proposition φ, there is a subset A of W such that M od(φ) = A. Let |A| denote the cardinality of A.
For convenience, we also call {μ 1 , . . . , μ n } a partition of set W when {A 1 , . . . , A n } is a partition and for any A i , Mod(μ i ) = A i , and hence any μ i is consistent.
Jeffrey's Rule
In probability theory framework, a well-known revision method is Jeffrey's rule [32] . 
Definition 2 (Jeffrey's rule) Let
A conventional extension for Equation (1) is that if P (μ i ) = 0, then P F (μ i ) = α i must be 0, and consequently α i P (w)/P (μ i ) is defined as 0 (otherwise it is not defined). This setting is also proposed in [3] for possibility measures that an impossible event should be always impossible. That is, if an event is impossible in terms of the initial epistemic state, then it should also be impossible in the input.
Jeffrey's rule revises the prior probability distribution P to P given an uncertain input with probabilities bearing on a partition of W . It produces a unique distribution that satisfies the following two equations [12] :
which shows that the new information is preserved and
which states that the revised (new) probability distribution P must retain the degree of conditional probability of any event φ that implies μ i . Note that Equation (3) can be equivalently written as:
This is often called probability kinematics [32, 12] . The following example shows how Jeffrey's rule is applied.
Example 1 (Adapted from [3] The following probability distribution provides an encoding of our initial beliefs.
And assume that we have a new piece of information, where the director of laboratory states that now booking the conference hotel is less plausible than booking a non-conference hotel. This new information is represented by the following uncertain input.
P (H) = 0.3, P (¬H) = 0.7
Then using Jeffrey's rule, we get the revised probability distribution as follows.
For the resulting epistemic state (P • p P ), we have
In the context of H (resp. ¬H), the plausibility ordering between B and ¬B in the initial epistemic state is the same as that in the resulting epistemic state. Hence, Jeffrey's rule admits input while respecting the minimal change principle.
Epistemic Space and Epistemic State
In order to define a general revision framework with uncertain input, we first provide formal definitions of epistemic space and epistemic state. 
Extension functions
Since a revision process usually involves some kind of set operation, so when strengths are attached to formulae/sets (as mentioned before, a formula corresponds to a set), we need some function being introduced to handle the operations on strengths of the sets, in particular, a function that associates the strength of a set to the strengths of its subsets. To this end, before defining epistemic states, we first define the notion of extension function. A function f associating a value in D to a multi-set of values in D is called an extension function if it satisfies This also follows the definition of aggregation functions in [36] . For simplicity, if there is no confusion from the context, for f ({x 1 , . . . , x k }) hereafter we will omit the multi-set sign and write it as f (x 1 , . . . , x k ).
In [36] , an aggregation function f is defined as a function associating a single non-negative integer to a set of non-negative integers and satisfies the following three properties:
An extension function is similar to an aggregation function in the sense that both of them attempt to associate a set of values to a single value within a given domain. The differences between them are (i) an extension function is defined on D instead of a set of integers; and (ii) it satisfies the Monotonicity property above instead of the Non-decreasingness property.
Note that Monotonicity property and Non-decreasingness property define two different classes of extension functions. For example, functions like median, mode satisfy Non-decreasingness but not Monotonicity and the function f in the following example satisfy Monotonicity but not Non-decreasingness. In some sense, Monotonicity imposes more constraints on the set-structure of the functions than Non-decreasingness, e.g., it excludes the mode function. In this paper, to prove the representation theorems, we require the Monotonicity property instead of the Non-decreasingness property. 
Partial and full epistemic states
Now we define epistemic states and epistemic spaces, which are similar to the definition of probability spaces and probability measures. • F is a partition of W ,
• Φ is a partial epistemic state, and
• f is an extension function.
Note that it would be more accurate to use {A 1 Note that a partial epistemic state Φ such that Φ(A) = α, Φ(A) = β is not equal to a full epistemic state Ψ such that ∀w ∈ A, Ψ(w) = a (e.g., in the probabilistic case, a = α/|A|, and in the OCF case, a = α), ∀w ∈ A, Ψ(w) = b and Ψ(A) = α, Ψ(A) = β by f Ψ . For example, in probability theory, a probability measure P with P ({man, woman}) = 0.8 does not mean P ({man}) = P ({woman}) = 0.4. Instead, from P ({man, woman}) = 0.8 we can obtain a family of possible probability distributions over W = {man, woman}. So a partial epistemic state can not be encoded by a full epistemic state.
Obviously, if Φ is a probability measure (D = [0, 1], f is +), then the above definition degenerates to the definition of probability space.
In this paper we use Φ, Ψ, Θ etc (possibly with a subscript) to denote an epistemic state.
Literally, although there have been many papers focusing on epistemic revision and merging, there does not exist a commonly accepted definition of epistemic state. In some papers (e.g. [14] ), no formal definitions of epistemic state are given, though the concept is used. In papers like [4] , the definition of epistemic state is always associated with an epistemic space which contains the observable parts of the epistemic state and the projection function to obtain the observable parts. In papers for knowledge base merging or arbitration (e.g., [39, 21] ), knowledge bases play the role of epistemic states. In some other papers, definitions for epistemic states are mainly based on plausibility orderings on possible worlds [49, 58, 59, 33] , etc. In addition, concrete representations like probability measures, OCFs, possibility measures could also be considered as epistemic states.
It is easy to see that an epistemic state as a plausibility ordering can be induced from a full epistemic state. That is, Value Φ(A) can be interpreted as an agent's epistemic firmness on A. Note that Φ(A) encodes all the information an agent provides on A, in particular, if the agent changes the value Φ(A) while maintaining Φ(A) unchanged, we should consider that the agent maintains its belief on A, despite that the agent has changed its belief on A. Usually, constraints are placed on Φ(A) and Φ(A), e.g., if Φ is a probability measure, then Φ(A) + Φ(A) = 1, or if Φ is an OCF , then min(Φ(A), Φ(A)) = 0. Here for generality, we do not assume any constraints on Φ(A) and Φ(A).
Intuitively, the Minimality property of f , when considered in Def. 4, ensures that if an agent thinks the true world is definitely not in a particular set, then the true world should not be in any of its subsets, and vice versa, i.e., Φ(
Similar properties are also introduced in [13] as the impossibility property and in [52] as the zero-preservation property. The Monotonicity property
, especially when Φ(A) is interpreted as a kind of plausibility value (epistemic firmness) of A. This property is very similar to Axiom A1: if A ⊆ B then P l(A) ≤ P l(B) for a plausibility measure P l [26] which was also mentioned in [30] .
Parallel to probability theory, probability distributions are applied (and discussed) more frequently than their corresponding probability spaces. In the following, most of the time we will only mention epistemic states without explicitly discussing their corresponding epistemic spaces too.
To ensure that a domain D contains sufficient but non-redundant elements, we impose two requirements on D.
Definition 6 D is strict iff it satisfies the following
and Φ(B) = y. 
Entailment of epistemic states
As W , D and f are assumed to be clear and unchanged throughout, an epistemic state Φ defined on F is denoted as Φ F . By abuse of notations, we also write Φ F (μ) = α when Φ F (A) = α and M od(μ) = A, i.e., a proposition is assigned a plausibility value which is the value assigned to the set of its models. In the following, we will use propositions rather than their corresponding sets of models.
We define the entailment of epistemic states as follows.
Definition 7 Let
From this definition, we can see that if Φ F1 entails Ψ F2 , then Φ F1 contains more specific information than Ψ F2 . Note that each element μ of F 2 is necessarily the union of several elements of F 1 . Hence Ψ F 1 (μ) can always be obtained using extension functions.
In the rest of the paper, to differentiate, a full epistemic state will be represented without a superscript describing a partition (e.g., Φ) and a partial epistemic state always with a superscript describing a partition (e.g., Ψ F ).
Revising Epistemic States by Partial Epistemic States

Epistemic Revision
Postulates
Motivated by the principle of Jeffrey's rule on conditioning on probability spaces and the ideal requirement that only the strengths of prior beliefs and evidence should determine the outcome of belief revision [14] , we propose the following constraints on revision in our epistemic space framework.
• Revision should be focused on a full epistemic state (representing prior beliefs or generic knowledge) revised by a partial epistemic state (representing a new, uncertain input). This is the spirit of Jeffrey's rule (revising a probability distribution with an uncertain input) and existing revision frameworks (e.g., prior beliefs are total pre-orders whilst an input is a propositional formula). Hence we use full epistemic states to encode current beliefs and partial epistemic states to encode new, uncertain inputs.
• Only the strengths of beliefs and new evidence determine the outcome of revision. This is the main argument in [14] . This postulate is intuitively in agreement with the Neutrality with respect to the intensity scale condition proposed in [17] which says in a social choice scenario, an aggregation function should not depend on the semantic meanings of a set of social choice functions, but only focus on their intensities of choices.
• New, most recent evidence has the priority. For one-shot revision, this is explained as that new evidence is preserved.
In addition, we also have a default assumption that an impossible event in the initial epistemic state should also always be impossible in the revision. That is,
Impossibility Preservation for any
This is a requirement of consistency between the initial state and the input, just similar to the settings for Jeffrey's rule and revision of possibility measures in [3] . Based on these constraints, we propose the following three postulates. Let • be a revision operator. 
ER1
ER3
For any μ ∈ F , and μ ∈ F , if Φ(μ) = Φ (μ ) and
To get a better understanding, ER3 can be stated with two separate steps as follows: For any μ ∈ F , and μ ∈ F , if
More generally, we require: for ψ μ and ψ μ ,
Explanation: This postulate implements the constraint that the strengths of beliefs and evidence determine the outcome of revision. More specifically, as evidence Ψ F (resp. Ψ F ) provides no information on ψ (resp. ψ ) directly, the only information related to ψ (resp. ψ ) is μ (resp. μ ) as ψ μ (resp. ψ μ ), so the strength of ψ (resp. ψ ) after revision should only rely on its own strength before revision and the strengths of μ (resp. μ ) before and after revision.
ER3 stems from Equation (4) of Jeffrey's rule. If we let Φ = Φ , Ψ F = Ψ F , μ = μ , then ER3 is reduced to:
Comparing to Equation (4), Φ • Ψ F can be viewed as the counterpart of the revised probability distribution P in Equation (4) and Φ as P . From this point of view, ER3 can be seen as an extension of Equation (4) to the epistemic state case. In addition, this postulate is intuitively in agreement with the Neutrality with respect to the intensity scale condition proposed in [17] which says in a social choice scenario, an aggregation function should not depend on the semantic meanings of a set of social choice functions, but only focus on their intensities (numerical values in [0, 1]) of choices.
A simple proposition induced from ER1 and ER2 is stated as follows.
Relationship with the AGM-KM postulates
In this subsection, we will make some remarks about the relationship between our postulates and the AGM-KM postulates [1, 34] .
In [1] , a set of belief revision postulates are proposed and in [34] , this set of postulates are reformulated. In [14] , Darwiche and Pearl presented a series of beautiful examples to illustrate the weakness of AGM-KM postulates on iterated belief revision.
But we should point out that the comparison with AGM-KM postulates and Darwiche and Pearl's postulates [14] have been done in two parts in this paper. Here in Section 5 we do a simple comparison aiming to show what is the counterpart of each the standard AGM-KM postulates and DP's postulates in our framework, and whether they can be defined in our framework. This is also a way to justify our postulates. Later in Section 7, we will provide a detailed comparison between the AGM-KM (and DP) framework and our framework which shows that when reducing to the belief revision situation, our postulates induce the same belief set as done by the AGM-KM (and DP) postulates.
Darwiche and Pearl recommended that to ensure the rational preservation of conditional beliefs 4 during (iterated) belief revision, a revision process shall perform operations on epistemic states not just on their belief sets.
With this intention, they modified the AGM-KM postulates to obtain a set of revised postulates in which an agent's original belief is in the form of epistemic states and new evidence is a propositional formula. The revised postulates for epistemic revision are
Here, Φ (possibly with a subscript) stands for an epistemic state 5 and μ and φ are propositional formulae. Φ • μ is an epistemic state after revising Φ with revision operator • by μ. When Φ is embedded in a propositional formula, it is used to stand for Bel(Φ) (its belief set which is a formula) not an epistemic state for simplification purposes, for example, Φ ∧ φ means Bel(Φ) ∧ φ. These postulates are natural extensions of the AGM-KM postulates to epistemic revision except that postulate (R4) is a weaker version of the original KM postulate 6 which states that if two equivalent formulae are revised by two other equivalent formulae respectively, then the revised results should be equivalent. Since different epistemic states can have the same belief set, (R4) requires that not just the two initial belief sets, but the two epistemic states must be identical:
7 Φ 1 = Φ 2 . It was argued in [33] that since there was no formal definition on epistemic states in [14] , it was not possible to define the equivalence of two such states. So (R4) is changed into
Obviously, ER2 is a straightforward generalization of R1, whilst ER1 extends R3 in the epistemic revision situation where new evidence is also an epistemic state. ER3, however, not only generalizes R4, but also is a key characteristic postulate of revision considering with strengths of beliefs and evidence. Actually this postulate shows that we do not need to care about the semantics of propositional formulae, but only their syntactical relations and their strengths determine the revision result.
There are no obvious generalizations for R5 and R6 in our postulates, because the conjunction of two formulae (for two belief sets) used in DP postulates is hardly generalizable on epistemic revision in our framework. In another words, the conjunction of two epistemic states are undefinable 8 . For instance, let W = {w 1 , w 2 , w 3 }, and let 
This proposition shows that when ER1-3 hold, then if new evidence is partially consistent with the prior state, then the consistent part is not changed, which can be seen as an extension of R2. 6 The postulate can be written as:
In [29] , an example nicely illustrating the difference between the original postulate and R4 is as follows.
Two jurors in a murder trial possess different biases; juror l believes "A is the murderer, B is a remote but unbelievable possibility while C is definitely innocent". Juror 2 believes "A is the murderer, C is a remote but unbelievable possibility while B is definitely innocent". The two jurors share the same belief set represented by the consequences of "A is the only murderer". A surprising new piece of evidence now states: "A is not the murderer" (A has produced a reliable alibi). Clearly, any rational account of belief revision should allow juror 1 to uphold a different belief set from juror 2.
Here the two jurors have the same belief set but different epistemic states. 8 In a similar sense, in [18] , it is argued that the case of expansion never occurs for probability functions. 
Iterated Epistemic Revision
Postulates
In this subsection, we propose postulates for iterated epistemic revision. Here the constraint that new, most recent evidence has the priority can also be explained under the context that when two pieces of new information happen to have the same partition F (which implies that both pieces of evidence refer to the same sets of hypotheses) but with different strengths of belief on them, then the most recent evidence overrules the previous one (as the latter (evidence) is assumed to represent the most recently received (and acceptable) information about a situation).
We have
Again this is for the consistency between the initial epistemic states and the inputs.
F is a refinement of partition F . Explanation: The latest fine-grained evidence overrules old ones. By the default assumption mentioned in Section 5.1 (Impossibility Preservation), in ER4*, for any μ ∈ F , if Φ(μ) = ⊥, then we must have Ψ F (μ) = ⊥. In addition, from Φ(μ) = ⊥, for any φ μ, we must have Φ(φ) = ⊥ (Minimality property in Section 4.1), then if φ ∈ F , it should be Θ F (φ) = ⊥ (Impossibility Preservation again). Therefore, Impossibility Preservation is also respected by ER4*. These two postulates can be called Iteration postulates.
Example 5 (Example 1 Cont')
Recall the initial probability distribution for whether JM is lodging in a conference hotel and whether he has a biometric passport is:
and the new evidence gives:
Now assume that the secretary of the director tells us that she remembers JM had booked a conference hotel. This information is represented by the following input:
P (H) = 0.9, P (¬H) = 0.1
Then from Jeffrey's rule, we can easily have the follows:
Probabilistic revision by Jeffrey's rule is an example that follows all the above ER postulates.
Relationship with DP's iterated postulates
To regulate iterated epistemic revision to preserve conditional beliefs, Darwiche and Pearl gave the following four additional postulates which are for four disjoint types of conditional beliefs.
As C1-C4 play an important role in the rest of the paper, here we repeat their explanations given in [14] . C1 states that when two pieces of evidence arrive, the second being more specific than the first, the first is redundant; that is, the second evidence alone would yield the same belief set. C2 says when two contradictory pieces of evidence arrive, the last one prevails; that is, the second evidence alone would yield the same belief set. C3 describes an evidence μ should be retained after accommodating more recent evidence α that implies μ given current beliefs. C4 gives that no evidence can contribute to its own demise. If μ is not contradicted after seeing α, then it should remain un-contradicted when α is preceded by μ itself.
In our framework, ER4 and ER4* are closely related to C1 and C2, but in general ER4 does not imply C1 and C2 while ER4* does.
Representation Theorems
In this subsection, we present our two representation theorems which provide semantic interpretations for postulates. For convenience, we recall Darwiche and Pearl's representation theorems [14] .
In [14] , two representation theorems are given to characterize the two sets of postulates, i.e., R1-R6 and C1-C4. First we introduce the definition of faithful assignment. In [14] , the proof of this representation theorem shows that an epistemic revision operator • satisfies postulate Ci iff condition CRi is satisfied,
Now we present our representation theorems. In order to establish them, we need to define the retentive and conductive operators on D.
Definition 9 An operator defined on D is called retentive if for any
The word retentive here intuitively means that when eliminating the equivalent second operands, the equivalence is still retained for the first operands. if for any a 1 , a 2 , a 3 
Definition 10 An operator defined on D is called conductive
The word conductive here intuitively means that when eliminating same items from two equations (the second operands in both the first and second equations), the remaining operands can be combined naturally to form a new equation.
The retentive requirement specifies how to remove equivalent item in one equation and the conductive requirement tells how to remove same items from multiple equations to form a new equation.
There are many concrete retentive and conductive operators, for example, if is the subtraction ('-') or division ('/') operator in mathematics, then it is retentive and conductive. Also, if D = {0, 1, · · · , n − 1}, where n is a natural number, then defined as x y = (x − y) mod n is also retentive and conductive. 
This theorem is a direct extension of Jeffrey's rule, as can be seen from the similarity between the two equations in the theorem and Equation (2) and Equation (3) of Jeffrey's rule (where is division). If the epistemic states in this theorem are probability measures, then we immediately obtain the two requirements used for defining Jeffrey's rule.
To some extent, this theorem shows how minimal change happens during epistemic revision in the sense that it preserves a kind of distance based on (although is not constructively given). Furthermore, evidently
are counterparts of Equation (2) and (4), respectively. As mentioned before, Equation (2) and (4) are necessary and sufficient conditions for Jeffrey's rule to yield a unique distribution. Therefore, this theorem presents a generalization of Jeffrey's rule.
With postulates ER1-ER3 and ER4*, we get the following representation theorem. and Φ be such that
Theorem 4 A revision operator • satisfies postulates ER1-ER3 and ER4* iff there exists a retentive and conductive operator defined on D such that for any full epistemic state Φ and any epistemic state
Ψ F , ∀μ ∈ F and ∀φ μ, (Φ • Ψ F )(μ) = Ψ F (μ) and (Φ • Ψ F )(φ) (Φ • Ψ F )(μ) = Φ(φ) Φ(μ).
Example 6 (An instance of revision operator) Let
W = {(a, b)|a ∈ N, b ∈ N ∪{∞}}, D = {2 a 3 b |a ∈ N, b ∈ N ∪{∞}} suchΦ((a, b)) = 2 a 3 b .
Let a new piece of evidence taken on partition
• n also satisfies postulates ER1-ER4 and ER4*, and f satisfies the Monotonicity Property but not the Non-decreasingness property. 6 Comparison with numeric revision strategies
Example 7 (An instance of an improvement operator) Improvement operators are introduced in [37] with a Weak Primacy of Update intuition such that the plausibility of the new information must be increased after the improvement, instead of having to be accepted as in the AGM framework. Let
D = {1, 1 2 , 1 4 , · · · , 1 2 i , · · · , 0}, f = max and = / (division) in
Jeffrey's rule
Since our framework aims to extend Jeffrey's rule, in this section, we look into how the postulates we proposed on iterated epistemic revision would coincide with Jeffrey's rule of conditioning. Formally, let P be a prior epistemic state which is a probability distribution on W , and a new piece of evidence shows that a partition F = {μ 1 , · · · , μ n } of W should take new probabilities as P F (μ i ) = α i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n with 1≤i≤n α i = 1. Let P be a probabilistic epistemic state (i.e., a probability distribution extended to 2 W by f = +), and P F be a probabilistic partial epistemic state, an epistemic state revision operator • constructed from Jeffrey's Rule (i.e. Definition 2) is defined as follows
We use the table below to compare our framework with Jeffrey's rule. Table 1 clearly shows that how our framework is reduced to the probability case and recovers Jeffrey's framework.
The following theorem shows that the above revision operator for probability updating satisfies our postulates.
Theorem 5 The revision operator • defined in Equation (5) satisfies postulates ER1-ER4 and ER4*.
In fact, Equation (2) of Jeffrey's rule can be directly recovered by postulate ER2, whilst Equation (3) of Jeffrey's rule, i.e., the probability kinematics, is implied in the ER postulates.
OCF Conditionalization and Possibility Revision
OCF conditionalization: An OCF [58] κ is a function from a set of possible worlds W to the set of ordinals with κ −1 (0) = ∅. It can be extended to a set of propositions as κ(μ) = min w|=μ κ(w). Given κ as the prior OCF, F = {μ 1 , · · · , μ n } as a partition and a new piece of evidence as λ
If we consider the conditionalization operator • c as a revision operator, then Equation (6) can be seen as a revision strategy, and we have
Theorem 6
The revision operator • c defined in Equation (6) One of the possibility conditioning methods is defined as
A counterpart of Spohn's (μ, α)-conditionalization was suggested in [20] in possibility theory such that if new evidence suggests that Π (μ) = 1 and Π (¬μ) = 1 − α (which implies N (μ) = α), then the belief change can take the following form
This simple revision operator can be easily generalized to a more complex situation which is a counterpart of Jeffrey's Rule and Spohn's general conditionalization. Formally, let Π be a prior epistemic state which is a possibility measure (Π can be seen as defined on W and extended to 2 W by f = max), and let F = {μ 1 , · · · , μ n } be a partition of W , the partial epistemic state for new evidence is defined as
Hence an epistemic revision operator • p in possibility theory can be constructed by a generalization of Equation (8) as follows
The following theorem shows that the above revision operator for possibility revision satisfies our postulates.
Theorem 7
The revision operator • p defined in Equation (9) satisfies postulates ER1-ER4 and ER4*.
Comparison with Logic-based Iterated Belief/Epistemic Revision
In this section, we compare our framework with other logic-based (iterated) belief revision frameworks. To do so, we need to ensure that each epistemic state has a non-empty belief set, hence we exclude epistemic states with empty belief sets. 
Particularly, if Ψ is a full epistemic state and μ is any propositional formula, Ψ satisfies the Maximality property iff it satisfies Ψ(W ) = , and Ψ(μ) = iff ∃w |= μ, Ψ(w) = . For instance, OCF and possibility measures satisfy the Maximality property.
In this section, if there is no other specification, we always take the Maximality property as a default assumption. Now we can define the belief set of an epistemic state as follows.
Definition 12 Let Φ F be a partial epistemic state which satisfies property Maximality, then its belief set Bel(Φ F ) is defined as
In other words, the belief set of an epistemic state (with property Maximality) is the set of propositions with a plausibility value . An alternative but not equivalent, weaker definition of belief set is Bel(
In the following, we only concentrate on epistemic states with non-empty belief sets. We can prove that the definition of entailment on epistemic states generalizes the classical definition of entailment on beliefs of epistemic states.
Proposition 3 Let
This proposition shows that our postulate ER2 is truly an extension of the success postulate of KM postulates [34] .
DP's Iterated Belief Revision
In this subsection, we aim to compare our framework with Darwiche and Pearl's iterated belief revision framework [14] . We show that only half of the DP postulates (C1 and C2) are covered by our framework.
For Conventionally, we just write ≤ Φ instead of writing ≤ •,Φ . w 1 ≤ Φ w 2 shows that w 1 is more plausible than w 2 in epistemic state Φ. Intuitively, if some w i s are the "most likely", i.e., Φ(w i ) = , then we should expect that for any w j , w i ≤ Φ w j . This is verified by the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Let Φ be a full epistemic state, if Φ(w
1 ) = , then w 1 ≤ Φ w 2 for any w 2 ∈ W .
Proposition 5 Let Φ be a full epistemic state, then ≤ Φ defined based on Definition 13 is a total pre-order.
The following definition of faithful assignment is a counterpart of that in [34] . 
Definition 14 Let
2. If Φ(w 1 ) = and Φ(w 2 ) = , then w 1 < Φ w 2 .
If Φ Ψ, then ≤ Φ =≤ Ψ where Ψ ∈ E is also a full epistemic state and Φ Ψ means that ∀w ∈ W , Φ(w) = Ψ(w).
The following proposition shows that our Definition 13 from Φ to ≤ Φ is a faithful assignment.
Proposition 6
The mapping from each full epistemic state Φ to ≤ Φ based on Definition 13 is faithful.
Theorem 8 Let Φ be a full epistemic state, μ be a propositional formula and • be an epistemic revision operator, if • satisfies postulates ER1-ER3 and ER4*, then we have
This theorem shows that the belief set from epistemic revision on an epistemic state Φ with Δ Fμ is equal to the belief set from belief revision on Φ with formula μ. It also reveals that our revision postulates imply DP's iterated belief revision postulates C1 and C2. Furthermore, this theorem, together with Proposition 5 and Proposition 6, also conclude that our postulates (ER1-ER3, ER4*) indeed imply R1-R6 when epistemic states have belief sets.
In general our postulates do not induce C3 and C4. In the epistemic states settings, C3 and C4 can be re-written as follows. Let μ = h, Δ μ be such that Δ μ (μ) = 0 and Δ μ (¬μ) = 2, w 1 = {¬c, h}, w 2 = {c, ¬h}, α = f orm(w 1 , w 2 ) and Δ α be such that Δ α (α) = 0 and Δ α (¬α) = 2.
Example 8 A father believes that his child X is clever(c) (i.e. as X usually gets high marks in exams) and very honest(h) (so he thinks X gets high marks not by cheating). His epistemic state at that time can be described by an ordinal conditional function κ such that κ(c, h)
Then we can easily check that
= which contradict to C3* and C4*, respectively.
The revision in the above example is in fact an extension of classical revision in the sense that the propositional part of new information is consistent with the prior state 10 but the strengths on some propositions are different. This is a natural extension, at least not surprising, as a revision is to revise the prior information with new information in the sense that new information is inconsistent with the prior information. In a belief revision setting, information is only represented as a formula, hence the inconsistency appears in the form of logical inconsistency of formulae. While in an epistemic revision setting, information is a formula plus its epistemic firmness, hence the inconsistency can also appear as that the same formula having different epistemic firmness, and therefore, needs a revision. This is also suggested in [9] that one might revise one's epistemic commitments without thereby revising one's beliefs. Our framework can encode this kind of revision but DP framework does not accept this. In this kind of revision, postulates C3 and C4 do not hold.
Three Kinds of Iterated Revision Strategies
In [24] , a review of belief change literature is presented, among which three wellknown revision strategies are mentioned, i.e., the conservative revision, moderate revision and radical revision.
In [8] , natural revision, or conservative revision is proposed that after revision, only the rank of the most plausible worlds of the evidence is changed to most plausible in the revised beliefs. That is, let • N be the natural revision operator, Φ be the initial state, μ be the evidence, w 1 , w 2 be any of the most plausible world of μ, i.e., w 1 , w 2 ∈ min(M od(mu), ≤ Φ ), and w 1 , w 2 be any other worlds, then natural revision can be described by the following revised plausibility orderings:
It is not difficult to see from Example 8 that our framework does not extend natural revision.
In [50, 51] , revision of epistemic entrenchment is proposed which in fact revises a full epistemic state by a full epistemic state in a lexicographic way. Epistemic entrenchment considers a kind of partial preorder based strength, but it still cannot express strengths in a general manner. Lexicographic revision is also called moderate revision. In moderate revision, we usually consider the Recalcitrance (Rec) postulate [51] and Independence (Ind) postulate [5, 33] as follows:
We can also prove that these two postulates do not hold when epistemic revision is reduced to belief revision. Note that from the semantics, it is easy to see that Rec implies Ind which implies C3 and C4. Hence it is natural that in Example 8, the same settings of Φ, α and μ also show that postulates Rec and Ind do not hold.
It is interesting to investigate further why postulates C3, C4, Rec, and Ind do not hold. We believe that the problem is rooted from postulate R*2. Postulate R*2 says that if the new information μ is consistent with the prior belief Bel(Φ) of the prior epistemic state Φ, then the belief set of revised epistemic state is the conjunction of the belief set of prior state and the new information (i.e., μ ∧ Bel(Φ), the consistent part). Note that R*2 simply ignores the inconsistent part (i.e., μ ∧ ¬Bel(Φ) and ¬μ ∧ Bel(Φ)). In a belief revision situation, this ignorance does not affect the revision result as the result only contains the consistent part. However, in our epistemic revision situation, as we want to get a full epistemic state after revision (hence the revision result should consider both the consistent and the inconsistent part), this ignorance should be properly handled. Example 8 shows that the belief set is not changed, but the firmness of other formulae are weakened. R*2 cannot distinguish these two situations, so C3, C4, Rec, and Ind are all failed here.
However, it is worth pointing out that the above investigation does not against iterated revision axioms in belief revision, since in belief revision, the belief set is the main set that axioms are designed for. But in epistemic revision, not only the belief set but also the revision strategy need to be considered too. Therefore, it is expected that some axioms for belief revision will not be suitable for epistemic revision.
Let • L be the lexicographic revision operator, it is not difficult to show the following results.
Proposition 7 Let Φ be the initial state, μ be the evidence, then we have
The last one, radical revision, or irrevocable revision, is in fact conditioning. A radical revision on evidence μ can be translated in our epistemic revision framework as revision on evidence Γ μ which is defined in Section 7.1, before Definition 13.
Revising Full Epistemic States by Full Epistemic States
A set of axioms (i.e., REE*1-REE*4, REE*It) for characterizing iterated revision of full epistemic states (total pre-orders) by full epistemic states was presented in [4] as follows.
Similarly, here an epistemic state Φ embedded in a formula stands for Bel(Φ).
The following result presents the relationship between the REE Axioms and our postulates.
Proposition 8 A revision operator
• satisfying REE*1-4 and REE*It also satisfies ER1-2 and ER4*.
ER3 is not mentioned in the above proposition since it is not interpretable (e.g., Φ(μ), etc) in the settings of [4] . In addition, the converse is false. This is not surprising since the framework of [4] leads to a unique solution.
Iterated Conditional Revision
In [35] , conditional preservation for belief revision is studied through the link of Ramsey Test [54] . This paper introduces an algebraic structure
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(readers can refer to [35] for details) which is a nice morphism to probabilistic algebra. They also introduced a notion conditional valuation function enforcing algebraic properties on A which makes A almost the full morphism to probabilistic algebra. Based on this algebraic structure, in [35] , epistemic states are defined as logic formulae equipped with conditional valuation functions, and then iterated conditional belief revision is axiomatized and investigated, showing that, with proper definitions, all the DP postulates (adapted in a conditional form) can be recovered. It is not so surprising since the algebraic structure defined in [35] is more specific than the definition of epistemic state in our paper. However, this also suggests that the framework in [35] may be too strict as recovering all the DP postulates implies rejecting Example 8 in Section 7.1 where our framework allows. Nevertheless, the algebraic structure is a good hint on developing future extensions of our framework to yield a unique solution for belief revision.
Two-dimensional Belief Revision
In [10, 25, 57, 56] , two kinds of two-dimensional belief revision, revision by comparison and bounded revision, are introduced. Unlike our epistemic states approach which is largely quantitatively, the two-dimensional revision lies between quantitative and qualitative approaches in that they do not use numbers and still able to specify the extent or degree to which a new piece of information is to be accepted [57] . But since two-dimensional revision only imposes a constraint on the acceptance degree of new information and another given formula, it does not have the same expressive power as our epistemic states revision does, although it is better than that of traditional belief revision. According to [3] , A1 means that the revised state is consistent, A2 is the success postulate, A3 says the new function keeps the previous relative order between models of each μ i , A4 illustrates that means that when the partial epistemic state is in agreement with prior possibility levels of μ i , then revision does not affect models of μ i , and A5 restricts that impossible worlds remains impossible after revision. These axioms are basic principles a revision strategy on possibility functions should satisfy. However, they do not lead to a unique solution for revision.
Revision on possibility functions
We can see that the revision operator defined in Section 6.2 satisfies all the axioms.
Probabilistic Revision using Counterfactual Probabilistic Functions
In [40] , belief revision using counterfactual probabilistic functions, or Popper functions, is proposed. In this approach, each probability function is attached with a unique Popper function which determines the revised probability function. In [7] , this approach is extended to revision by probabilistic ordinal conditional functions, which is also associated with corresponding Popper functions. However, in [7] , it shows that this Popper function approach has an unattractive feature that the relationship between a Popper function and its revision can be arbitrary. In addition, in both papers, it is the ranks of possible worlds (determined by a simple plausibility ordering, or an pre-given OCF), rather than the strengths (i.e., the probability values), that play a role in revision.
Other research works on belief revision
Apart from the research works addressed above, there are still a lot of other papers proposing alternative belief revision models that are relevant or partially relevant to our revision framework. In [11] , it proposes a way to deal with contradicting information by considering a support ordering on that information. In [23] , a framework of belief revision is proposed where the epistemic input is a pair < A, i > where A is a set of sentences and i represents the layer of the stratified belief base to be revised. In some sense, the layer of the stratified belief base to be revised can be seen as the set of beliefs (with the same strength) to be affected by the revision process. In [16] , revision postulates are verified in situations that new evidence (a formula) is accepted only when its certainty degree exceeds some confidence level c, and it shows that in this case, many revision postulates do not hold. In [43] , a revision framework is investigated where the revision result is determined by the strength of information instead of the arrival order, and shows that it actually leads to a merging operator.
Conclusion
Jeffrey's rule is a well-known and important rule that guides the probability kinematics. It can also be seen as a revision strategy for probability measures. Due to its importance in revision and practical usage, OCF and possibility measures, etc, have introduced its counterparts to serve as their revision strategies. But since these counterparts are all for particular kinds of epistemic states, an investigation of extending Jeffrey's rule to generalized epistemic states is desirable. In this paper, we have proposed a general definition of epistemic states and studied its revision strategy where new, uncertain evidence is represented as a partial epistemic state. We introduced a formal definition of epistemic state which can cover a variety of definitions of epistemic states in the literature. A set of epistemic revision postulates and their corresponding representation theorems were then provided from which we can recover several well-known revision strategies including Jeffrey's probabilistic kinematics and the revision of full epistemic states by full epistemic states. A comparison with logic-based belief revision frameworks was also presented.
When reducing to the belief revision situation by Darwiche and Pearl (where new evidence is a propositional formula and each epistemic state has a belief set), our postulates subsume two of the DP's postulates while other remaining postulates are not suitable for iterated epistemic revision.
The underlying assumption of belief revision is that the most recent evidence has the highest priority. This assumption has its drawbacks. Darwiche and Pearl realized this issue and concluded that a natural way to resolve this is to allow the outcome of belief change depends on the strength of evidence triggering the change. In the Future work section [14] , they briefly discussed an idea of using multiple revision operators • m instead of a single revision operator, where • m means revising an epistemic state with evidence having strength m. However, how to design such operators and how to manage a sequence of revision operators • m1 , • m2 , ..., • mn remain to be investigated.
The assumption of giving priority to the most recent evidence is also questioned in [15] . To get around this assumption, iterated revision is taken as a prioritized merging where a set of evidence is prioritized according to their reliabilities rather than the time points these pieces of evidence arrive. The revised (or the merged) result is a consistent belief set such that when a more reliable piece of evidence is inconsistent with a less reliable piece of evidence, then the reliable evidence should be preserved in the belief set.
A minor drawback with the method in [15] is that it should preserve all the previous pieces of evidence to form a prioritized observable base before merging. But usually (or from a limited memory perspective) revision is only based on current state and recent evidence. In [42] , a belief change framework is proposed to deal with the belief revision on epistemic states that the uncertain input is not surely accepted which does not need to record all the previous pieces of evidence.
In the literature, the success postulate, i.e., giving new information primacy, is also violated by non-prioritized belief revision operators 11 (cf. [31, 24] for an overview). However, usually strength does not play a role in non-prioritized belief revision. Also, non-prioritized revision is more closely to fusion than revision. Let K be the initial state and μ be the evidence, a simple example of non-prioritized revision gives K • μ ∨ μ • K where • is an ordinary revision operator. The difference between fusion and non-prioritized revision is largely the starting point.
For our future work, we will investigate belief expansion and contraction in our epistemic framework. Furthermore, study on revising a partial epistemic state with a partial epistemic state with some additional constraints (e.g., maximum-entropy) is also an interesting topic. Finally, postulational approaches to belief revision are criticized in [53] that belief revision operators defined in these approaches are in fact ill-defined, and belief revision hence should be better studied with an independently motivated epistemological theory. We are interested in whether this conclusion still holds on our Proof of Proposition 1: From ER2, we have Φ • Φ |= Φ. From ER1, we have Φ • Φ is a full epistemic state. From Definition 7, it is easy to see that the only full epistemic state that entails Φ is Φ itself. Hence we have Φ • Φ = Φ.
Proof of Proposition 2: By Proposition 1, we know Φ • Φ = Φ. Therefore, by setting Φ and Φ to Φ, Ψ F to Ψ F , Ψ F to Φ, μ and μ to μ, and ψ and ψ to φ in ER3,
Proof of Theorem 3:
The proof is similar to the one in [34] and [14] . (⇒) Suppose there is a revision operator • satisfying postulates ER1-ER4.
we rewrite Φ(φ 1 ) = x and Φ(φ 2 ) = y, then we define x y def = (Φ• Γ φ2 )(φ 1 ) (see the definition of Γ in Section 7.1). Later we will show that this definition is independent of Φ, φ 1 , φ 2 .
As Γ φ2 is a partial epistemic state (since φ 2 is satisfiable), from ER2, Φ • Γ φ2 is a full epistemic state, so our definition holds. Now first we prove that for any
. From the Minimality property, we get that Γ φ2 is equal to an epistemic state Θ
does hold. Then we prove that is independent of Φ, φ 1 and φ 2 . It suffices to prove that Now as is retentive and Φ(μ) = Φ (μ ), we obtain Φ(ψ) = Φ (ψ ).
2. If Φ(φ) = Φ (φ ), then similarly, it is easy to show that
, hence as is retentive, it is equal to prove that 
Proof of Theorem 4: (⇒)
As ER4* is a stronger version of ER4, from Theorem 3, we immediately get a retentive operator as defined in the proof of Theorem 3. The remain problem is to show that is conductive.
Suppose Φ and Ψ are two epistemic states, and φ 1 , φ 2 , φ 3 , ψ 1 , ψ 2 , ψ 3 are propositions s.t. φ 1 φ 2 φ 3 , ψ 1 ψ 2 ψ 3 . We need to show if Φ(φ 1 ) Φ(φ 3 ) = Ψ(ψ 1 ) Ψ(ψ 3 ), and Φ(φ 2 ) Φ(φ 3 ) = Ψ(ψ 2 ) Ψ(ψ 3 ), then Φ(φ 1 ) Φ(φ 2 ) = Ψ(ψ 1 ) Ψ(ψ 2 ).
From the definition of in the proof of Theorem 3, we just need to prove that if 
, for arbitrary ψ, the same proof can be found in the proof of Theorem 3 for ER4 using equivalent instantiation. Proof of Proposition 5: We prove that ≤ Φ is total, reflexive and transitive. This proof is to some extent similar to the one in [34] and [14] . 
